Continuing to present the extraordinary research of the late Antony Sutton—
Today’s Sutton excerpt comes from his 1986 book, The Best Enemy Money Can Buy.
As usual, the detail is shocking. So are the names of the men.
The question is why: why are these men doing this?
Are they bankrolling and supplying both sides of a war for the money? Is because they want to make both sides equal, in hopes that a standoff will avert a global catastrophe?
My position is clear. I’ve stated it before.
When you can fund and supply two enemies, you’re already thinking about the aftermath, when the conflict will diminish or end. You’re planning to build an organization that will “manage the peace.”
That organization will have to be large. Very large. Which is exactly what you want. It will take on the shape of something like global governance—as much governance as you can create and impose.
Which is really what you wanted all along.
Which was why you funded and supplied both sides in the first place.
Which is why you’re called Globalists.
(And I’m not just talking about the United Nations. That’s merely one piece of a much larger “management” structure.)
OK. Now here is the Sutton excerpt:
“Although the military output from [Soviet] Gorki and ZIL was well known to U.S. intelligence and therefore to successive administrations, American aid for construction of even large military truck plants was approved in the 1960s and 1970s.”
“Under intense political pressure from the deaf mute blindmen, U.S. politicians, particularly in the Johnson and Nixon administrations under the prodding of Henry Kissinger (a long-time employee of the Rockefeller family), allowed the Togliatti (Volgograd) and Kama River plants to be built.”
“The Volgograd automobile plant, built between 1968 and 1971, has a capacity of 600,000 vehicles per year, three times more than the Ford-built Gorki plant, which up to 1968 had been the largest auto plant in the USSR.”
“Although Volgograd is described in Western literature as the ‘Togliatti plant’ or the ‘Fiat-Soviet auto plant,’ and does indeed produce a version of the Fiat-124 sedan, the core of the technology is American. Three-quarters of the equipment, including the key transfer lines and automatics, came from the United States. It is truly extraordinary that a plant with known military potential could have been equipped from the United States in the middle of the Vietnamese War, a war in which the North Vietnamese received 80 percent of their supplies from the Soviet Union.”
“The construction contract, awarded to Fiat S.p.A., a firm closely associated with Chase Manhattan Bank, included an engineering fee of $65 million. The agreement between Fiat and the Soviet government included:”
“The supply of drawing and engineering data for two automobile models, substantially similar to the Fiat types of current production, but with the modifications required by the particular climatic and road conditions of the country; the supply of a complete manufacturing plant project, with the definition of the machine tools, toolings, control apparatus, etc.; the supply of the necessary know-how, personnel training, plant start-up assistance, and other similar services.”
“All key machine tools and transfer lines came from the United States. While the tooling and fixtures were designed by Fiat, over $50 million worth of the key special equipment came from U.S. suppliers. This included:
1. Foundry machines and heat-treating equipment, mainly flask and core molding machines to produce cast iron and aluminum parts and continuous heat-treating furnaces.
2. Transfer lines for engine parts, including four lines for pistons, lathes, and grinding machines for engine crank-shafts, and boring and honing machines for cylinder linings and shaft housings.
3. Transfer lines and machines for other components, including transfer lines for machining of differential carriers and housing, automatic lathes, machine tools for production of gears, transmission sliding sleeves, splined shafts, and hubs.
4. Machines for body parts, including body panel presses, sheet straighteners, parts for painting installations, and upholstery processing equipment.
5. Materials-handling, maintenance, and inspection equipment consisting of overhead twin-rail Webb-type conveyors, assembly and storage lines, special tool ‘sharpeners for automatic machines, and inspection devices.”
“Some equipment was on the U.S. Export Control and Co-Corn lists as strategic, but this proved no setback to the Johnson Administration: the restrictions were arbitrarily abandoned. Leading U.S. machine-tool firms participated in supplying the equipment: TRW, Inc. of Cleveland supplied steering linkages; U.S. Industries, Inc. supplied a “major portion” of the presses; Gleason Works of Rochester, New York (well known as a Gorki supplier) supplied gear-cutting and heat-treating equipment; New Britain Machine Company supplied automatic lathes. Other equipment was supplied by U.S. subsidiary companies in Europe and some came directly from European firms (for example, Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics of the United Kingdom supplied six industrial robots). In all, approximately 75 percent of the production equipment came from the United States and some 25 percent from Italy and other countries in Europe, including U.S. subsidiary companies.”
“In 1930, when Henry Ford undertook to build the Gorki plant, contemporary Western press releases extolled the peaceful nature of the Ford automobile, even though Pravda had openly stated that the Ford automobile was wanted for military purposes. Notwithstanding naive Western press releases, Gorki military vehicles were later used to help kill Americans in Korea and Vietnam.”
“In 1968 Dean Rusk and Wait Rostow once again extolled the peaceful nature of the automobile, specifically in reference to the Volgograd plant. Unfortunately for the credibility of Dean Rusk and Wait Rostow, there exists a proven military vehicle with an engine of the same capacity as the one produced at the Volgograd plant. Moreover, we have the Gorki and ZIL experience. Further, the U.S. government’s own committees have stated in writing and at detailed length that any motor vehicle plant has war potential. Even further, both Rusk and Rostow made explicit statements to Congress denying that Volgograd had military potential.”
“It must be noted that these Executive Branch statements were made in the face of clear and known evidence to the contrary. In other words, the statements can only be considered as deliberate falsehoods to mislead Congress and the American public.”
“…Up to 1968 American construction of Soviet military truck plants was presented as ‘peaceful trade.’ In the late 1960s Soviet planners decided to build the largest truck factory in the world. This plant, spread over 36 square miles situated on the Kama River, has an annual output of 100,000 multi-axle 10-ton trucks, trailers, and off-the-road vehicles. It was evident from the outset, given absence of Soviet technology in the automotive industry, that the design, engineering work, and key equipment for such a facility would have to come from the United States.”
“In 1972, under President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the pretense of ’peaceful trade’ was abandoned and the Department of Commerce admitted (Human Events, Dec. 1971) that the proposed Kama plant had military potential. Not only that, but according to a department spokesman, the military capability was taken into account when the export licenses were issued for Kama.”
“The following American firms received major contracts to supply production equipment for the gigantic Kama heavy truck plant:
* Glidden Machine & Tool, Inc., North Tonawanda, New York — Milling machines and other machine tools.
* Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., New York, N.Y. — A contract for $20 million of equipment.
* Holcroft & Co., Kovinia, Michigan — Several contracts for heat treatment furnaces for metal parts.
* Honeywell, Inc., Minneaspolis, Minnesota — Installation of automated production lines and production control equipment.
* Landis Manufacturing Co., Ferndale, Michigan — Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.
* National Engineering Company, Chicago Illinois — Equipment for the manufacutre of castings.
* Swindell-Dresser Company (a subsidy of Pullman Incorporated), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania — Design of a foundry and equipment for the foundry, including heat treatment furnaces and sine;ting equipment under several contracts ($14 million).
* Warner & Swazey Co., Cleveland, Ohio — Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.
* Combustion Engineering: molding machines ($30 million). Ingersoll Milling Machine Company: milling machines.
* E. W. Bliss Company”
“Who were the government officials responsible for this transfer of known military technology? The concept originally came from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who reportedly sold President Nixon on the idea that giving military technology to the Soviets would temper their global territorial ambitions. How Henry arrived at this gigantic non sequitur is not known. Sufficient to state that he aroused considerable concern over his motivations. Not least that Henry had been a paid family employee of the Rockefellers since 1958 and has served as International Advisory Committee Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a Rockefeller concern.”
“The U.S.-Soviet trade accords including Kama and other projects were signed by George Pratt Shultz, later to become Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration and long known as a proponent of more aid and trade to the Soviets. Shultz is former President of Bechtel Corporation, a multi-national contractor and engineering firm.”
“American taxpayers underwrote Kama financing through the Export-Import Bank. The head of Export-Import Bank at that time was William J. Casey, a former associate of Armand Hammer and now (1985) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Financing was arranged by Chase Manhattan Bank, whose then Chairman was David Rockefeller. Chase is the former employer of Paul Volcker, now Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank. Today, William Casey denies knowledge of the military applications (see page 195), although this was emphatically pointed out to official Washington 15 years ago.”
“We cite these names to demonstrate the tight interlocking hold proponents of military aid to the Soviet Union maintain on top policy making government positions.”
“On the other hand, critics of selling U.S. military technology have been ruthlessly silenced and suppressed.”
“For two decades rumors have surfaced that critics of aid to the Soviet Union have been silenced. Back in the 1930s General Electric warned its employees in the Soviet Union not to discuss their work in the USSR under penalty of dismissal.”
“In the 1950s and 1960s IBM fired engineers who publicly opposed sale of IBM computers to the USSR…”
—end of Sutton excerpt—
In the current climate of “cancel anything Russian,” supporters of that campaign ought to be calling for the cancellation of Americans indicted in Sutton’s work.
But of course, how many people know what Sutton discovered?
The widespread ignorance is no accident.